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THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
OF THE 2012 BUDGET
Basic Economic Processes
First, I would like to explore the issue of the
possible effects of budgetary consolidation on
growth outlooks. Several empirical studies have
dealt with the same issue (e.g. McDermott and
Wescott, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1995;
Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Giavazzi, Jappelli
and Pagano, 2000; Von Hagen, Hughes Hallett
and Strauch, 2001; Ardagna, 2004; Giudice,
Turrini, int’t Veld, 2007; Alesina, 2010). These
studies generally arrived at the conclusion that
fiscal consolidation tended to hold back
growth in the short term. Although there are
some exceptions to this; for instance, the con-
solidation implemented in Ireland and
Denmark in the 1980s. Several factors influ-
ence the speed with which the impact of the fis-
cal consolidation, after the initial decline, turns
into growth. The cited studies have shown that
growth outlooks are more favourable, if the
consolidation takes place in a positive interna-
tional environment, if it is mostly based on
measures on the expenditure side, if the output
gap is negative at the outset, and if the CDS
spreads were high before the consolidation was
launched. Successful consolidation also tends
to hinge on structural measures. On the other
hand, consolidation tended to be less success-
ful when preceded by a financial crisis. In light
of the above, it is a question as to what kind of
an opinion one should form about Hungary.
What should be done to ensure that these so-
called non-Keynesian growth incentive effects
come into play in Hungary as soon as possible? 
On the one hand, Hungary’s CDS spreads
need to be reduced as quickly as possible,
which would have a positive effect on growth
vis-à-vis the reduction of long-term interest
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rates. Unfortunately, currently the reduction of
CDS spreads is held back by the growing con-
cerns about the European debt crisis and the
fact that regardless of how significant the
reduction of the current external financing
need of the Hungarian economy has been,
shedding the accumulated large amounts of
debt is going to be a slow process, which will
continue to leave the Hungarian economy vul-
nerable in the long term. On the other hand,
the government has set ambitious goals, which
are laudable, however the announced measures
carry significant implementation risks. 
Investments, employment – and through that
– growth would be encouraged by long term
positive change in the revenue outlooks of the
players of the economy prompted by budgetary
consolidation. For example, if companies feel
that no additional taxes will be imposed on
them, that has a positive effect on their invest-
ment activities and general level of activity. This,
however, is contradicted by the still fragile glo-
bal recovery, by the fact that our neighbouring
export markets are also undergoing fiscal con-
solidation and that Hungary is now being sub-
ject to a major balance-sheet adjustment. The
population is grappling with an enormous debt
burden, which is likely to hold back consump-
tion in the medium term as well. Investment
activity has been low in certain sectors in the
long-term (in the construction industry as well
as in the area of market services), which is fur-
ther enhanced by the uncertainty of the regula-
tory and tax environments. 
Thirdly, growth could also be kick started, if
the banking sector would aid recovery through
lending. Unfortunately, in reality we can see
that Hungary is not in a very good position in
this regard either. Lending has been on the rise
in virtually all the countries in the region with
the exception of Hungary. 
In summary, it is reasonable to ascertain that
although budgetary consolidation is underway,
it should not be expected that the non-
Keynesian effects can substantially contribute
to the mitigation of the direct demand shrink-
ing effect of the measures. 
Let us now take a look at how the MNB
views the macroeconomic outlooks of
Hungary. I would like to cite the latest inflation
report of the MNB from March. Based on the
forecasts published in the report, growth of
around 3 percent expected this year as well as
next year. In contrast to previous forecasts, this
growth and these changes already include the
stimulating effect of consumption and invest-
ments in addition to the beneficial effect of net
exports. (See Chart 1)
Internal demand is slow to pick up despite
the fiscal incentives. As mentioned above,
internal demand is particularly hard-hit by the
restrained lending on the part of the banks. As
seen in Chart 1, the domestic loan portfolio of
the corporate and retail sectors dropped off
steadily until the end of 2010, and the
unfavourable tendencies have continued this
year as well. Several analyses have been drawn
up in MNB about the reasons thereof. In our
opinion, when the crisis hit there were strong
supply effects in place, whereas later on lower
demand was the most important reason behind
the reduction of the overall loan portfolio.
Over the last few months, however, supply
constraints have once again taken effect. That
is to say that it is not loan demand that is hold-
ing back growth – although it is quite weak –
but loan supply. (See Chart 2)
As mentioned earlier, the fact that outlooks
are uncertain for the whole of Europe leaves its
mark on employment and the development of
internal demand. This, in turn, holds back the
expansion of employment. Chart 3 shows
changes in GDP and employment during the
years of the crisis and since the recovery.
Ostensibly, in 2008-2009 during the recession,
employment and GDP decreased proportionate-
ly in most countries. In contrast, since the start
of the recovery, between the end of 2009 and PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
309
Chart 1
THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL GDP CHANGES
Source: MNB
Chart 2 
CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC LOAN PORTFOLIO OF THE CORPORATE 
AND RETAIL SECTORS – EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTED
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2010 – shown by the green dots here – although
output has already started to expand, employ-
ment has not followed suit. This is what charac-
terises the majority of countries, including
Hungary. In our opinion, this might partly be
due to the uncertainty of long-term outlooks. 
That is to say that employment lags behind
recovery, which creates a loose labour market
in Hungary. In our opinion, unemployment
will remain above 10 percent in the next two
years in Hungary, as a result of which wage
growth is expected to be extremely modest. In
addition to a loose labour market, this could
also be influenced by the possibility of increas-
ing net wages with unchanging gross wages as a
result of the PIT cut. Overall, it is our opinion
that until the end of our forecast time horizon
real wage growth may fall short of the expect-
ed growth in productivity. This could improve
the competitiveness of the country and miti-
gate the inflationary pressure on the economy.
(See Chart 4)
Generally speaking, inflationary processes
are characterised by duality. On the one hand,
the economy has been hit by significant cost
shocks, which keep inflation high, especially
items not included under core inflation. That is
to say that there is an outside inflationary pres-
sure that is essentially external in nature. At the
same time, the internal inflationary pressure
originating from the real economy is rather
low, as is core inflation, which moderates ripple
effects. According to our forecasts, the effects
of the cost shocks will level out on the mone-
tary policy horizon, and the 3 percent inflation
target will be within reach by the end of 2012.
However, there are significant two-way risks
standing in the way of achieving this target.
There is great uncertainty with regard to the
future path of the cost shocks. In addition, the
measures taken by the government – here I
would like to mention the various measures
taken by the government aimed at reducing
demand, the elimination of price subsidies, the
Chart 3 
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND GDP IN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF THE CRISIS 
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treatment of the price moratorium and the
measures designed to increase activity – pose
significant uncertainty with regard to inflation.
(See Chart 5)
The public finances forecast of MNB
for March
The March 2011 forecast of the MNB showed
an accrual budget surplus of 2.5 percent of
GDP for 2011. This figure was reached taking
into account the transfer of private pension
fund assets and the debt consolidation of MÁV
(Hungarian State Railway Company), but did
not include the information derived from the
April EDP report of the government (i.e. the
assumption of the debt of the Budapest
Transport Company and the repurchasing of
the PPP investment projects). The latter one-
off items bring down the forecasted 2011 budg-
et surplus by roughly 1 percent of GDP .
Because the details were unavailable, MNB was
only able to take into consideration a fraction
of the impact of the previously announced sta-
bility reserve as a rule.
In its 2012 forecast, MNB revealed two dis-
tinct fiscal paths.1 In our rule-based forecast,
due to the lack of detail, we were only able to
take into consideration less than gross HUF
100 billion of the gross HUF 550 billion effect
of the Széll Kálmán plan (Hungary’s Structural
Reform Programme) anticipated by the gov-
ernment (mainly the continued levying of the
bank tax and the measures aimed at the restruc-
turing of sick pay). Relative to 2011, this
growth path showed a deteriorating balance
and a current budget deficit of 4.6 percent of
the GDP for 2012.
Considering that the government seemed to
be committed to fiscal adjustment achieved
through the reduction of government expendi-
ture, in March of 2011 in addition to our usual
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native fiscal path, which was based on a norma-
tive approach. In this alternative scenario we
took into consideration the entire, targeted
balance improving effect of the Széll Kálmán
Plan, but – pursuant to an expert estimate – we
reduced the gross effect with indirect taxes,
after which this netted effect was further
reduced by the so-called “second-wave” effects
originating from changes in the macroeconom-
ic path. As a result, the expected 1.8 percent
savings of the Széll Kálmán Plan for 2012
improved the balance of the budget by 1.2 per-
cent of GDP . Ultimately, our alternative path
predicted a budget deficit of 3.6 percent of
GDP for 2012. Based on this it was already
clear in March that the government’s 2012
deficit target of under 3 percent (2.5 percent of
GDP) was unachievable even if the Széll
Kálmán Plan was successfully implemented in
its entirety.
In its fiscal forecasts, MNB uses the cycli-
cally adjusted augmented SNA balance as the
indicator to describe the medium-term posi-
tion of public finances assuming no further
general government measures. Compared to
the accrual based ESA balance, this indicator
filters out the so-called quasi fiscal effects and
the effects of “creative accounting”, spreads
out the capital revenue derived from the with-
drawals from the private pension fund scheme
on a past horizon and adjusts the current bal-
ance for the fiscal effect of the economic
cycle, which produces a result that better
reflects the processes affecting the budget in
the long-term. 
The fiscal adjustments that took place after
2006 have continuously improved the medium-
term position of public finances. Between 2006
and 2012 the structural balance improved from
–9.3 percent to –1.3 percent of GDP . (See Chart
6) As a result of this adjustment process that
lasted for several years, the medium-term posi-
tion of public finances reached its best value to-
date in 2010.2 In 2011, as a result of the tax cuts
Chart 5 
ANNUAL PRICE CHANGE OF CORE INFLATION AND ITEMS NOT INCLUDED UNDER CORE INFLATION
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and the real yield payouts of private pension
funds, the medium-term forecast is once again
dropping off sharply (to –5.1 percent of GDP).
Based on our rule-based Inflation Report of
March, inflation is only going to improve
slightly in 2012 (–4.0 percent), but given the
alternative scenario – which assumes that the
Széll Kálmán Plan will be implemented fully –
into consideration, the rate of inflation ends up
below 3 percent (–2.6 percent).
Since 2002, high levels of general govern-
ment deficit have caused a rapid increase in
public debt. (See Chart 7) In 2008 and 2009 the
drawing of IMF/EU loans accelerated the
growth of the gross debt ratio, but a part there-
of was allocated in deposit form. The
Hungarian Government drew a total of EUR
12.8 billion, of which it used EUR 9.5 billion
until March to finance the general budget.
Based on our March forecast, in 2011 the debt
ratio will be reduced by 5 percent of GDP .
Although fiscal processes and debt assumption
– without the long-term blocking of the stabil-
ity reserve – have slightly elevated debt levels,
this was offset by the one-off revenue item
generated from private pension fund savings.
In 2012, it will only be possible to reduce
debt levels, without resorting to the reserves, if
the government consistently implements its
plans to cut the deficit. In the beginning of
2012, there could be significant amounts (4–5
percent of GDP) at the government’s disposal
from the Pension Scheme Reform, the Debt
Reduction Fund, as well as the deposit that was
made from the IMF/EU loans. Therefore,
changes in the debt ratio will significantly
depend on the government’s decision regarding
what proportion of the reserve to use to
finance the general government. Using the
entire reserves to reduce the national debt
could cut the year-end debt portfolio by up to
4 percent of GDP .
Chart 6
HISTORIC CHANGES IN THE MEDIUM-TERM POSITION OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
AND THE MARCH FORECAST OF MNB
Source: MNB
Alternative scenario 2012 Medium-term general government position PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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The GDP redistribution ratio calculated
from consolidated general government expen-
diture has remained virtually the same since
2006. In 2007, it’s value dropped from 56 per-
cent calculated for 2006 (up primarily because
of one-off items) to 50 percent, then fluctuat-
ed between 50 and 49 percent in 2008–2010.
The effect of the adjustments is recognisable
mainly in that despite the substantial shrinking
of the denominator – i.e. GDP – during the cri-
sis, the redistribution ratio did not increase
considerably. Based on our March forecast,
despite more accelerated economic growth, the
redistribution ratio will even rise somewhat in
2011, from 48.9 percent last year to 49.2 per-
cent this year.
The redistribution ratio forecasted by us
will, however, drop in 2012. Under the alterna-
tive March Inflation Report scenario – which
takes all the effects of the Széll Kálmán Plan
into account – the same value is 1 percentage
point lower (45.8 percent) as compared to the
calculations relying on the so-called rule-based
path (46.7 percent). In the standard case sce-
nario, expenditures expressed as a percentage
of GDP are reduced by the one-off effect of
the MÁV consolidation, decreasing interest
costs, dwindling municipal investment projects
and the fact that the most important expendi-
ture aggregates (personnel and non-personnel
expenses and transfers) are growing at a slow-
er rate than the nominal growth rate of GDP .
The Convergence Programme
The convergence programme released by the
government in April is a significant step for-
ward in terms of revealing the details of the
Széll Kálmán Plan as well as the fiscal policy of
the next few years. As a result, the programme
increases the credibility of economic policy and
contributes to enhancing investors’ perception
of Hungary.
Chart 7 
HISTORIC CHANGES IN PUBLIC DEBT AND THE MARCH FORECAST OF MNB
Source: MNB
Baseline scenario excl. the utilisation of assets
Alternative scenario excl. the utilisation of assets
Baseline scenario incl. the total utilisation of assets in 2012
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The convergence programme presents con-
crete and quantifiable measures aimed at
achieving the savings targets announced in the
Széll Kálmán Plan. Moreover, the fact that the
government has undertaken measures to reach
the balance targets in addition to those stipu-
lated by the Széll Kálmán Plan is commendable.
That is because, as I have mentioned earlier,
according to MNB’s calculations the Széll
Kálmán Plan in itself would not have been suf-
ficient to meet the 2012 deficit target.
According to the current preliminary calcula-
tions of MNB, the accrual-based 2012 deficit
can only drop below 3 percent of GDP , if every
measure of the convergence programme were
implemented with the effect elaborated in the
programme.
One of the highest risks in terms of the fea-
sibility of the 2012 deficit target is in relation to
the HUF 250 billion stability reserve generated
in February of 2011. That is because according
to the convergence program, this reserve would
be cancelled this year and included in the plan-
ning basis next year. Due to the fact, however,
that the details are as yet unknown, it is not
possible to gauge the extent to which the
implementation of the cancellation is support-
ed by savings measures promising to be long-
term, or by the simple shifting of this year’s
palpable expenditure tensions to next year.
That is why it is imperative for the government
to publish the cancellation of appropriations in
a transparent manner and in sufficient detail.
As I have mentioned earlier, significant
progress has been made in terms of the level of
detail available on the Széll Kálmán Plan, but
some of the implementation risks continue to
persist. The outlined planned labour market
and pension scheme measures of the govern-
ment as well as the significant drop in the num-
ber of beneficiaries may lead to grave social
tensions. If the government does not provide
the necessary additional funds to promote the
entry to the labour market of the groups
adversely affected by its measures, the resulting
social consequences may run the risk of these
planned measures becoming unsustainable. It is
also worth noting that the government is plan-
ning to consolidate the debt of MÁV in 2011.
Afterwards, in the next 2–3 years, theoretically
the subsidisation of public transport can be
reduced (in excess of the assumed interests) in
a manner that is not underpinned by cutting
operating costs, or real improvement in the
efficiency of the public transport company. In
this case, however, MÁV would once again face
another round of indebtedness and the struc-
tural balance would not improve significantly.
We consider the announced labour market
measures to be questionable in terms of their
ability to live up to the expectations attached to
them. In our opinion, the steps designed to
reintegrate disabled pensioners into the labour
market will only be able to improve employ-
ment figures to a marginal extent. The majori-
ty of disabled pensioners have a low level of
education; more than 40 percent of them have
only completed primary school. The employ-
ment chances of this layer of society are mini-
mal. According to our calculations, in Hungary
between 2004 and 2008 due to the already
stringent disability pension regulations and
practices, the number of disabled pensioners
with a low level of qualifications has increased
substantially. At the same time, the employ-
ment rate of this group remained the same. In
contrast, disabled pensioners with a higher
level of qualifications were successful in their
attempts to return to the labour market. The
ratio of successful job seekers in this group is
equal to the ratio of non-disabled people in the
same age group. The employment chances of
people with low level qualifications have wors-
ened further as a result of the crisis; this was
the group hit hardest by increasing levels of
unemployment. That is why, in our opinion,
increasing the employment of disabled retirees
will also require the establishment of active PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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labour market programmes, and these pro-
grams will, in turn, require additional budget-
ary funds. (See Chart 8)
The tasks of the Fiscal Council related
to the 2012 Budget and planned MNB
analyses to support the work of the
Council
The new Constitution is going to enter into
force on January 1, 2012. Therefore, until then
the operation of the Fiscal Council (FC) will
be governed by provisional rules currently stip-
ulated by Act LXXV of 2008 on Cost-efficient
State Management and Fiscal Responsibility.
Although the Fiscal Responsibility Act only
stipulates one responsibility of the FC (providing
an opinion on the Act on the Budget before its
submission for debate), in its spirit it is no 
different from the Constitution in that a 
legislative desire to establish an FC with more
overarching responsibilities is apparent from
the wording of the Act.
The Constitution determines the fundamen-
tal provisions with respect to the FC3 as well as
the fundamental rules pertaining to the central
budget4, which the FC must take into consid-
eration during its work. The Constitution
bestowed the following strong powers onto the
Fiscal Council: 
X The Fiscal Council is an organ that sup-
ports the legislative activity of the National
Assembly and examines the substantiation of
the central budget. 
Y The Fiscal Council contributes to the
preparation of the Central Budget Act in the
manner specified by law.
Z The prior approval of the Fiscal Council
is required for the adoption of the Central
Budget Act – in order to comply with
Paragraphs (4) and (5) of Article 36 of the
Constitution.
These strong powers in independent, demo-
cratic countries where the rule of law predomi-
nates such as Hungary entail certain obligations.
That is because one of the tenets of the rule of
law is legal security, which is essentially condi-
Chart 8
DISABLED PENSIONERS ACCORDING TO LEVEL OF EDUCATION IN 2010 
Source: MNB
8 years of elementary school or lower
Vocational training
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tional upon the predictable behaviour of law
enforcers – for instance on how the FC exercis-
es its powers. It follows from the requirements
of the rule of law and legal security that the draft
legislation must clearly delineate the framework
and criteria under which the FC can exercise its
powers. The Council must live up to its strong
mandate, namely through independent, trans-
parent and expedient operation as well as the
provision of professionally sound opinions.
Without an objective framework, independence
and transparency the operation of the Fiscal
Council would be unpredictable and subjective
as a result of which its decisions would become
questionable. 
Independence not only means independence
from other government bodies, but also inde-
pendence of Council members from one
another. This is not the case today, as the SAO
audits the MNB and the president of the
Council is the president of the Supervisory
Board of the central bank, who thus also audits
the central bank. In addition, the SAO is also
entitled to audit the Supervisory Board of the
MNB. This is not in line with international best
practices, but that does not mean that the body
cannot function properly. Professional credibil-
ity, however, hinges on the FC’s ability to ade-
quately support its decisions and make them
available to all interested, disclose any dissent-
ing opinions, make analyses publicly available
and ensure that the analytical methodologies
used are controllable. One of the most impor-
tant common reasons why fiscal councils are
established around the world is to increase
transparency for legislators as well as for the
general public, the tax payers of the country.
This task, however, can only be implemented, if
the institutions themselves operate transpar-
ently. 
MNB wishes to contribute to the profes-
sional grounds on which the FC makes its deci-
sions through several analyses, the planned
content and the publication schedule of which
I will now present in brief. The analyses pre-
pared for the FC are no different from the
other publications of the MNB in terms of
their sophistication, but their focus tends to be
somewhat different in that they evaluate the
fiscal processes, the deliverability of balance
targets and fiscal sustainability as opposed to
the effects of fiscal policy on the macroecono-
my and financial stability. The themes and the
time horizon of the analyses were determined
with a view to what is relevant for the min-
istries working on the preparation of the Act
on the Budget, the MPs that will vote on the
bill and also to ensure that it related to the
budget planning cycle. Naturally, in addition to
the analyses of MNB the FC is also going to
take other background materials into account
in order to be able to fully perform its task.
The fundamental objective of the medium-
term outlook based on the already adopted
budget to be first published in 2012 is to pro-
vide a strategic foundation and support for the
next budget. On the one hand, this analysis
would contain the medium-term (4–5 year)
impact study of the Act on the Budget and
other relevant pieces of legislation, with partic-
ular regard to the constitutional debt rule and
the enforcement of the requirements stemming
from EU membership. On the other hand, the
analysis would also assist in gauging what kind
of amendments are necessary to relevant legis-
lation in the medium term. To this end it would
shed light on the delayed, long-term effects of
the demographic, employment trends and rele-
vant acts of legislation.
Our analysis of the planning frameworks,
which we plan to publish as early as this summer,
is aligned with the start of the preparation of the
current budget appropriation bill. The purpose
of the analysis is to present the planning basis
that determines the budgetary elbow room avail-
able next year and to expand the relevant infor-
mation pool available especially to legislators.
The publication would evaluate the relevant PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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budgetary processes of the current year, give a
forecast on expected compliance with the budg-
et balance and the core lines of the budget, and
would also take the risks that need to be consid-
ered during planning into account.
Providing a preliminary opinion on the budg-
et appropriation bill of the government is linked
to the closure of the preparatory phase, the
main purpose of which is to call the attention
of the government and the legislature to the
planning problems that need to be resolved
before the bill is submitted for debate.
Therefore, it would assess the draft bill on the
basis of the following considerations: 
• the substantiation of the macroeconomic
forecast;
• the extent to which revenues and expendi-
ture are in line with the most likely macro-
economic path and the related legislation
(acts and decrees);
•  the extent to which the deficit arising
therefrom is in line with the debt rule stip-
ulated by the Constitution;
•  whether the proposal complies with the
provisions of the Acts on Budgetary
Responsibility and Public Finances with
regard to transparency and reasonable level
of required detail;
• the evaluation of the structural position of
the budget;
• whether the budget is consistent with the
requirements arising from EU membership,
•  taking account of the most significant
risks affecting the budget.
The analysis containing a repeated opinion on
the budget appropriation bill would be drawn up
in time for the vote on the key figures of the
budget (presumably in November). The pur-
pose of this analysis would be to assess what
steps have been taken in terms of the budget
balance as a result of the relevant new acts of
legislation and motions for the amendment of
legislation submitted since the first opinion on
the budget appropriation bill. The importance
of providing an opinion on the bill will be
enhanced by the fact that in the future the
budget can only be adopted with the prior
approval of the FC. The decision of the FC in
this regard must not come as a surprise to
Parliament, the government or the public. That
is why the Council must inform the stakehold-
ers about its position while the Act on the
Budget is being worked out, in order to enable
them to eliminate the circumstances that stand
in the way of the FC’s consent. 
The aspects of the second report would
match those applicable to the opinion to be
provided prior to the submission of the draft
bill, but in the second round, it would rely on a
more extensive base of information. Based on
our experience, several key pieces of informa-
tion providing a basis for the budget are only
revealed after the bill has already been submit-
ted. These include the detailed macroeconomic
path assumed by the government, the three-
year budget outlook, or the detailed justifica-
tion of the appropriations under the various
chapters.
1 At the time the article was submitted (10 June
2011), MNB’s forecast for June was not yet avail-
able.
2 This is partly due to the revenues generated from
extraordinary taxes, which represent 1.3 percent of
GDP , for which this particular structural indicator
does not filter, and also to the fact that the value of
the cyclical component calculated by us – -2.4 of
the GDP – was at its worst in 2010.
3 Article 44 of the Constitution
4 Articles 36-37 of the Constitution
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